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ABSTRACT 
According to the identifiability effect, people will donate more to a single beneficiary rather than 
to many beneficiaries, holding constant what the donations are actually used for. We test the 
identifiability effect for two novel subject pools (the suppliers and beneficiaries of volunteer 
labor). We also test a refinement of the identifiability effect where we vary whether or not the 
single beneficiary is personally known to the solicitees. While the behavior of volunteers is 
consistent with the identifiability effect, we find that the identifiability effect is reversed for 
beneficiaries of volunteer labor. Moreover, we find that making the single beneficiary personally 
known to the solicitees lowers donations by a statistically insignificant amount, suggesting that it 
does not enhance donations.  
JEL Codes: D64, L31 
Keywords: solicitation; donation; field experiment 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Fundraising drives are ubiquitous in the not-for-profit world—individual contributions in the 
United States totaled roughly $218 billion in 2012 (Giving USA, 2013). They provide critical 
financial support to organizations that might not exist otherwise, and almost every non-profit 
depends on a degree of active solicitation from potential donors who might not have given 
otherwise. This seemingly altruistic behavior has drawn considerable attention from academics 
interested in understanding why people give (Radley & Kennedy, 1995; Bekkers & Wiepking, 
2011; List & Price, 2012; Oppenheimer & Olivola, 2012). There is a rich literature on how the 
psychology of charitable giving is related as much to the context of the ask itself, as it is by the 
ultimate effect of the donation. 
An important contextual factor is the number of beneficiaries perceived by a potential donor 
when solicited for charitable contributions: a beneficiary could be presented as a large number of 
people, such as “help feed orphans,” or as a single person, e.g., “help feed Alex, who is an 
orphan.” This phenomenon has been termed the “identifiability effect” (Schelling, 1968), and 
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holds true even when the actual use of the donations is equivalent, as well as the information 
about the cause conveyed by the single/multiple targets (Small & Lowenstein, 2003). Many 
mechanisms have been proposed—vividness, empathy, social distance, and goal attainability 
have all been demonstrated to play a role in lab settings (Oppenheimer & Olivola, 2012).  
The present study was designed to contrast these different accounts of the identifiability effect 
among populations with pre-existing relationships to the beneficiaries. Specifically, we wanted 
to measure the marginal effect of one’s personal connection to the cause, above and beyond the 
identifiability effect, since personal connections have been shown to increase donations (Small & 
Simohnson, 2008). Our dataset allows a unique opportunity to contrast these hypotheses in the 
same study, and among two populations that have distinct personal relationships to the cause. 
We report the results from two field experiments that test these two different forms of the 
identifiability effect. A non-profit that trains volunteers to give free financial advice to its clients 
carried out a fundraising campaign where it solicited for financial donations from both sets of 
stakeholders: its clients (the recipients of the free financial advice advice) and its volunteers (the 
dispensers of the free financial advice). Each group would also serve as the other group’s 
“target” when invoking the identifiability effect, i.e., clients would be told that their donations 
are helping individual volunteers, and vice versa. Since the two groups directly interacted with 
each other as a result of the non-profit’s activities, members of each group knew members of the 
other group personally. 
Both clients and volunteers were randomly assigned to one of three treatments, varying only the 
target of the message. In the control treatments, the entire non-profit was the target. In the other 
two treatments (known and unknown), in line with the literature on the identifiability effect, 
individual names were used as examples—volunteers heard an actual client’s name in the ask, 
while clients heard an actual volunteer’s name. In the unknown treatments, the name was 
unknown to the person being asked. In contrast in the known treatments, the script used the name 
of a specific volunteer (client) that actually helped (was helped by) the person being asked. 
This design allows us to compare different accounts of the identifiability effect. The control and 
unknown conditions replicate previous studies that use anonymous targets and donors, albeit 
with a nominally novel subject pool (the clients and volunteers in a non-profit organization, each 
of which has a distinct relationship to the non-profit). This constitutes a test of what we refer to 
as the orthodox identifiability effect. The unknown and known conditions can test the marginal 
effect of whether a face-to-face relationship helped an identified target, compared to an 
anonymous target. We refer to this as a test of the extended identifiability effect. 
Regarding the orthodox identifiability effect, we find that the volunteer data are consistent with 
the literature, but the client data support the reverse, i.e., solicitees donate less and with a lower 
probability when there is a single beneficiary. We also find that our data directionally (though 
not statistically) reject the extended identifiability effect: solicitees donate smaller amounts and 
with lower probability when a single beneficiary is someone with whom they have personally 
interacted. 
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Our results contribute to the existing literature on identifiability in several ways. First, the 
orthodox version of the identifiability effect fails a simple robustness test: extending the subject 
pool to the clients of a non-profit where the target is the non-profit’s service provider. This 
suggests that the theory underlying the identifiability effect may need to be refined. Second, our 
results suggest that one logical extension of the orthodox identifiability effect—the proposition 
that personally knowing the single beneficiary of a solicitation increases solicitee donations—is 
unsupported by the data. Consequently, as far as enhancing charitable contributions is concerned, 
the extended identifiability effect is a comparatively fruitless avenue of further investigation. 
2. BACKGROUND: SOCIAL DISTANCE AND CHARITY 
There is widespread recognition in the literature about the importance of social distance to 
charitable contributions. For example, scholars have found that people are more willing to assist 
acquaintances than strangers (Nolan & Spanos, 1989; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Ma, 1992). 
Beyond this, Small and Simonsohn (2008) have shown that people in the lab and the field give 
more to health charities (cancer, heart disease, etc.) if they have family member who has been 
afflicted; likewise, with sexual assault victims (Christy & Voight, 1994). A similar mechanism 
has been proposed for donations from “hot lists” of those who have already given—that is, the 
personal connection can build empathy for the cause (Landry et al. 2010). In another paper 
studying this very same firm, we show that long-term volunteers give more, and respond more 
positively to future solicitations than recent joiners (Yeomans & Al-Ubaydli, forthcoming). 
Many of the same mechanisms that explain the effects of social distance are also used to explain 
the identifiability effect, (Small & Loewenstein, 2003). Identifiable targets evokes more empathy 
(Kogut & Ritov, 2005), and goals are easier to perceive, psychologically, with single 
beneficiaries (Slovic, 2007). This comparison is often drawn explicitly (Small, 2012)—it is as 
though the clarity of the mental image is a proxy for distance, as though the beneficiaries were 
watched from afar on a foggy day. Thus, we predicted that if the beneficiary in question was 
actually known to the person being solicited, that mental image might be even clearer, and have 
more of an effect. Formally, we propose an extended identifiability effect whereby a unique 
target known to the solicitee should result in the highest donations of all. 
An additional determinant of social distance is the nature of the interaction between the solicitor 
and solicitee, controlling for the history of interactions between the two individuals. One factor 
in particular is the degree of anonymity that the solicitation technique affords the solicitee, which 
has been demonstrated to have an effect on observed charity (Burnham, 2003; Charness & 
Gneezy, 2008). Thus, for example, subjects playing the dictator game donate smaller amounts 
when they are guaranteed 100% anonymity compared to when the experimenter is aware of their 
donation (Hoffman et al., 1996). 
In anticipation of our experimental design, two solicitation methods are telephone solicitations, 
which are synchronous, and voicemail solicitations, which are asynchronous. Given the greater 
degree of anonymity that we would associate with the asynchronous voicemail solicitations, we 
would expect larger donations when solicitations are made over the telephone rather than over 
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voicemail. Beyond the social distance forces underlying this prediction, by inducing an 
immediate verbal response, phone calls may create more commitment to giving (Cialdini, 1993), 
whereas the effect of voicemails might be diluted by procrastination (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 
1999). Accordingly, both orthodox and extended identifiability effects should be accentuated 
when conditioning on phone rather than voicemail solicitations. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.1. ENVIRONMENT 
The following draws heavily from Yeomans and Al-Ubaydli (forthcoming). The US tax code is 
complex system and preparing taxes is an arduous annual task for many US citizens. In fact 
many less-educated citizens fail to file their taxes due to their inability to comprehend the tax 
code. The income tax system’s progressivity means that many of the non-filers are people who 
are actually due money back from the Federal Government, and their failure to file means that 
they forgo these often sizeable sums of money. 
The Center for Economic Progress (CEP) is a Chicago-based non-profit organization that 
provides free tax preparation assistance to low-income families and individuals trying to navigate 
the abstruse US Income Tax Code. Each year, it trains approximately 1,500 volunteers to assist 
the Center’s clients. For the volunteers to perform their duties, the CEP sets up centers 
throughout the greater Chicago area equipped with computers. Clients then bring their tax 
materials to their local center where a volunteer guides them through the filing process, which 
usually takes one-to-two hours. The volunteering season runs in tandem with the tax filing 
season: January until the middle of April. 
In 2011, the CEP helped prepare 28,134 tax returns (< $25,000 annual income per single filer; < 
$50,000 per couple) at 29 locations across Illinois. However, due to state budget cuts, they 
shrank to 15 locations for the 2012 season, and decided to conduct an active fundraising drive for 
the first time among their clients and volunteers. The CEP were keen to maximize the yield on 
their drive, and to refine their fundraising techniques (Baber et al., 2001; Al-Ubaydli & Lee, 
2011). We advised them on how to conduct a natural field experiment to meet their goals. The 
logistical details (execution, data collection) were all handled internally by the CEP. 
3.2. PROCEDURE: CLIENTS 
Clients were solicited immediately after their tax preparation was complete—they parted from 
their assigned volunteer preparer and headed to a common administrative table before leaving. 
The person manning that table would make sure to answer any administrative questions, and 
reinforce information about how to submit tax returns. During the experiment conducted in the 
2012 season, they also delivered a short verbal solicitation using a prepared script. 
The content of that script was manipulated between the three treatment conditions. Across all 
conditions, the script briefly described the non-profit’s financial needs, and described how 
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donations might be targeted to stem reductions in service provision. In the generic condition, the 
target of the donation was the broader non-profit. 
As you know we are a non-profit, and we want you to consider making a small donation to support our cause. There 
have been large statewide budget cuts that have forced us to cut back our services, preventing CEP from helping 
more people like you. Even a small donation will make it possible for us to reach others who need our services. 
In the unknown condition, the target was the name of an actual volunteer from that specific tax 
site, though not one that was working that particular day. 
As you know we are a non-profit, and we want you to consider making a small donation to support our cause. There 
have been large statewide budget cuts that have forced us to cut back our services, preventing volunteers like 
[volunteer name] at our [location] tax site from helping more people like you. Even a small donation will train more 
volunteers like [volunteer’s first name] to reach others who need our services. 
In the known condition, the target was the name of the volunteer that had just helped the client 
prepare their tax returns. 
As you know we are a non-profit, and we want you to consider making a small donation to support our cause. There 
have been large statewide budget cuts that have forced us to cut back our services, preventing volunteers like 
[client’s volunteer’s name] at our [location] tax site from helping more people like you. Even a small donation will 
train more volunteers like [volunteer’s first name] to reach others who need our services. 
In all cases it was made clear that the money itself went to the non-profit, to control for 
preferences about how that money is actually spent, rather than the persuasiveness of an appeal 
to the needs of each of the three targets. 
After the script was read, clients were offered two ways to donate. They were given an envelope 
addressed to CEP, which clients could use to mail in a check at any time. A special donation-by-
text number was created, too, so that clients could also send an SMS to the number and have 
their donation charged to their phone bill at the end of the month. Either way, the clients were 
left with all the necessary information and materials to make a donation when they left the site. 
Ideally, The CEP would have randomized the solicitation treatment at the client level. However 
logistical constraints meant that they could only randomize at the site level. The agents carrying 
out the solicitation, who were operating a considerable geographical distance from centralized 
CEP staff, were unaware that they were administering an experiment. Asking them to modify 
their solicitation spiel without a discernible reason would have risked exposing the experiment to 
the solicitees, thereby undermining the benefits associated with the solicitees being unaware of 
their participation in an experiment. These benefits are particularly acute when one studies 
matters that pertain to social preferences, including charitable contributions (Levitt and List, 
2007). The left panel of Table 1 details the site-level randomization. 
3.3. PROCEDURE: VOLUNTEERS 
The departure point was a database containing all the volunteers as of January 18, 2012. The 
CEP knew in advance that it would later have access to a range of demographic information 
about each volunteer drawn from a survey during training, but due to limited administrative 
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resources, this information was not available at the stage at which volunteers would be allocated 
to treatments. 
Solicitations were conducted over the phone. To ensure that the solicitations were done in a 
professional fashion, the CEP hired professionals from a temporary employment agency. The 
solicitors were all blind to the experiment. Solicitors were instructed to call each volunteer up to 
three times. After listening to the script, a volunteer who expressed interest in donating would be 
asked if he/she would prefer to receive the written donation instructions by email or by mail (our 
dataset is based on received rather than promised donations). If the volunteer could not be 
reached after the third call, then the solicitor would leave a voice message. 
The volunteer solicitation script was manipulated along the same lines as the client solicitation 
script—a short message detailed the financial problems at CEP. This was followed by a 
suggestion of who might benefit from the donation, which varied between subjects. In the 
generic condition, the target of the donation was the broader non-profit. 
As you know we are a non-profit, and we want you to consider making a small donation to support our cause. There 
have been large statewide budget cuts that have forced us to cut back our services, preventing volunteers like you 
from helping more CEP clients in need. Even a small donation will make it possible for us to reach others who need 
our services. 
In the unknown condition, the script referred to a client from that volunteer’s tax site that came 
on a different day. 
As you know we are a non-profit, and we want you to consider making a small donation to support our cause. There 
have been large statewide budget cuts that have forced us to cut back our services, preventing volunteers like you 
from helping more people like [client name] from our [location] tax site. Even a small donation will train more 
volunteers to reach others, like [client’s first name], who need our services. 
In the known condition, the script referred to a client for whom the volunteer had done a tax prep 
session (except those solicited immediately after training and before they had had a chance to 
start work properly; in that case, it was a name from the training). 
As you know we are a non-profit, and we want you to consider making a small donation to support our cause. There 
have been large statewide budget cuts that have forced us to cut back our services, preventing volunteers like you 
from helping more people like [client name] from our [location] tax site. Even a small donation will train more 
volunteers to reach others, like [client’s first name], who need our services. 
After the script was read, if the volunteer agreed to make a donation, they were able to request a 
follow-up either through the post or through e-mail. This follow-up, much like the package given 
to clients, explained both the text message and check-in-the-mail donation methods. 
Unlike clients solicitations, volunteer solicitations were done remotely from the CEP head office, 
and they were conducted by a small number of professionals under the supervision of CEP staff. 
This allowed for randomization at the volunteer level. The right panel of Table 1 details the 
randomization with respect to the sites, confirming the balance. 
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3.4. PREDICTIONS 
Our first prediction is based on the orthodox identifiability effect. 
Prediction 1: Solicitees will donate larger amounts and with higher probability when there is a 
single beneficiary (known, unknown treatments) than when there are many beneficiaries (generic 
treatment). 
Our experiment examines the orthodox identifiability effect applied to a novel subject pool: the 
suppliers and beneficiaries of volunteer labor. This is a straightforward replication/robustness 
exercise. While there is no ex ante reason to expect either group’s behavior to differ from that of 
other groups studied in the literature or from each other, we explore the possibility. 
Our second prediction is based on the as-yet-untested extended identifiability effect. 
Prediction 2: When there is a single beneficiary (known, unknown treatments), solicitees will 
donate larger amounts and with higher probability when the beneficiary is someone with whom 
they have personally interacted (known treatment) than when it is a stranger (unknown 
treatment). 
Our third prediction examines phone vs. voicemail solicitations for volunteers.  
Prediction 3: If either the orthodox or extended identifiability effect are detected for volunteers, 
the effect will be stronger when conditioning on volunteers who were solicited by phone than 
those who were solicited by voicemail. 
The identifiability effect treatments are exogenous with respect to whether or not the volunteer 
was reached by phone, implying that there are no sample selection effects when conditioning on 
being solicited by phone. Regardless, anticipating our statistical analysis, it is worth noting the 
absence of a particularly strong relationship between whether a volunteer was solicited by phone 
and variables that common sense would suggest might have an effect, such as employment 
status. 
4. RESULTS 
Collecting data on clients was very systematic because it was linked to the completion of a tax 
return, and so a full array of demographic controls are available. In contrast, demographic data 
collection on the volunteers was not as rigorous as volunteers had the option of skipping 
questions in the survey. Consequently, we have a full array of demographics for only 1,348 
(80%) of the 1,691 volunteers solicited. We focus on the results that include demographic 
controls; unconditional analysis allows for a larger sample but does not substantively alter the 
results, and so we relegate it to appendix tables.  
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4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 contains the main descriptive statistics. While some of the demographic variables are 
common to both clients and volunteers, there are also quite a few that are unique to either group. 
Mean donations were $0.15 for the clients and $1.40 for the volunteers. Clients donated 0.74% 
of the time while volunteers donated 2.1% of the time. These disparities are most easily 
explained by the fact that clients were almost de facto from the poorest components of society. 
Beyond this, the volunteers are people with a demonstrated history (present) of charitable 
contributions—specifically time donations—and donating time is correlated with donating 
money (Duncan, 1999). 
4.2. MAIN RESULTS 
We investigate the predictions using two dependent variables: donation, which is the $ donation 
and takes weakly positive values (with “0” being the mode by a huge margin), and a donation 
dummy, which takes the value “1” when the donation is strictly positive. Since clients, which 
comprise the bulk of the data, were randomized at the site level and there were only 14 sites with 
client data, it is preferable for inference to be based upon parametric models with controls rather 
than the usual suite of non-parametric unconditional tests. 
Thus, in the models where donation is the dependent variable, we use a tobit regression with site-
level clustered standard errors, and in the models where donation dummy is the dependent 
variable, we use probit regressions with site-level clustered standard errors. Table 3 contains the 
unconditional means of the dependent variables of interest by treatment (and site in the case of 
clients), and Table 4 contains the results of the parametric models including controls. 
Result 1a: The orthodox identifiability effect is absent in the client data, i.e., solicitees donate 
smaller amounts, and with lower probability, when there is a single beneficiary (known, unknown 
treatments) compared to when there are many beneficiaries (generic treatment). Moreover, there 
is some evidence that the identifiability effect is reversed. 
From Table 3, clients solicited with the generic script donated an average of $0.29 per client, and 
they donated 1.3% of the time. The corresponding figures for the unknown treatment were $0.11 
and 0.63% respectively, while for the known treatment they were $0.071 and 0.43% respectively. 
Thus, ignoring covariates, the data do not support the identifiability effect (in fact they support 
its obverse). 
In Model 1 in Table 4, which is a tobit with controls where the dependent variable is donation, 
we see that compared to the baseline of the generic many beneficiary script, being solicited 
according to the unknown single beneficiary script leads to a statistically significantly lower 
donation (p < 0.05). The effect of the known single beneficiary script is even larger in terms of 
the point estimate, though it does not attain conventional statistical significance. (See Table A1 
for the same regressions above and below without controls; the conclusions are unaffected.) 
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In Model 2 in Table 4, which is a probit with controls where the dependent variable is donation 
dummy (and the reported coefficients are marginal effects at the sample mean), we see that 
compared to the baseline, the Unknown script yields a 0.30% lower chance of donating (p < 0.1), 
while the Known script yields a 0.54% lower chance of donating. 
In Model 3 and Model 4, we rerun the tobit and probit with one difference: we indirectly pool 
Unknown and Known scripts by making their pooled data the baseline and including a dummy 
for the Generic script. In both cases, the coefficient on Generic is positive and marginally 
significant (p < 0.1). Thus if the data suggest anything at all, it is that there is no identifiability 
effect for clients. 
Result 1b: The orthodox identifiability effect receives some support in the volunteer data, i.e., 
solicitees donate more and with higher probability when there is a single beneficiary (known, 
unknown treatments) compared to when there are many beneficiaries (generic treatment). 
However the differences are not statistically significant. 
From Table 3, volunteers solicited with the generic script donated an average of $0.56 per client, 
and they donated 1.4% of the time. The corresponding figures for the unknown treatment were 
$1.6 and 2.3% respectively, while for the known treatment they were $1.2 and 1.6% respectively. 
Thus, ignoring covariates and setting aside statistical significance, the data directionally support 
the identifiability effect. 
In Model 5 in Table 4, which is a tobit with controls where the dependent variable is donation, 
we see that compared to the baseline of the generic many beneficiary script, being solicited 
according to the unknown single beneficiary script leads to a larger donation, as does being 
solicited according to the known single beneficiary script. However neither attains conventional 
statistical significance. 
In Model 7 in Table 4, which is a probit with controls where the dependent variable is donation 
dummy (and the reported coefficients are marginal effects at the sample mean), we see that 
compared to the baseline, the unknown script yields a 1.1% higher chance of donating, while the 
known script yields a 0.088% higher chance of donating. Again, neither is statistically 
significant. 
Similar to Result 1a, in Model 9 and Model 11, we rerun the tobit and probit pooling unknown 
and known scripts. In both cases, the coefficient on generic is negative and insignificant. Thus, 
the data provide directional evidence in favor of the presence of the identifiability effect for 
volunteers. 
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Result 2: For clients and volunteers, the data do not support the extended identifiability effect, 
i.e., when there is a single beneficiary (known, unknown treatments), solicitees donate smaller 
amounts and with lower probability when the beneficiary is someone with whom they have 
personally interacted (known treatment) than when it is a stranger (unknown treatment), though 
the differences are statistically insignificant. 
The aforementioned figures in Table 3 confirm that in terms of unconditional means, the known 
script results in lower donations and with a lower probability than the unknown script for both 
clients and volunteers. 
Turning to the regressions with controls in Table 4, Model 1, 2, 5, and 7 all exhibit a lower 
coefficient on known than on unknown, though the difference is never statistically significant 
using conventional tests. 
In the volunteer data, we detect neither the orthodox nor the extended identifiability effect (in the 
client data we observe a reversal of the orthodox effect). This could be because only 55% of 
volunteer solicitees were solicited by voicemail only, which is unlikely to have a strong effect 
compared to being solicited by phone. 
An arguably higher powered test of the identifiability effect is achieved by conditioning on those 
who were solicited by phone (45% of the sample). As per the clarification above, being solicited 
by phone vs. by voicemail is exogenous with respect to treatment assignment, and so the 
estimates of the causal effects of each script remain unbiased. As it happens, conditioning on 
phone solicitations increases treatment effects but in a statistically insignificant way. 
Result 3: In volunteer solicitations, conditioning on those solicited by phone leads to larger 
treatment effect on donations and on the probability of donating, but the difference and the net 
treatment effects are all statistically insignificant. 
Model 6, 8, 10, and 12 replicate models 5, 7, 9, and 11, respectively but conditioning on those 
who were solicited by phone only. With one exception, all treatment coefficients increase in size 
but remain statistically insignificant. Regressions which include phone and voicemail solicitees’ 
data but allow for different treatment effects detect a statistically insignificant difference between 
the treatment effects of the two groups. 
For those interested in the relationship between phone solicitation and the other observables, in 
Table A2, we estimate a probit where the dependent variable is the phone solicitation dummy 
variable. As expected, being employed reduces the probability of being phone solicited in a 
statistically significant way, but somewhat surprisingly the effect is quite small in magnitude 
(7%). 
A final point regarding the empirical analysis concerns the site-level randomization of the client 
data. A comparison of Table 4 (non-linear regressions with controls) with Table A1 (non-linear 
regressions without controls) confirms the following. First, the controls have substantial 
explanatory power: they increase the pseudo R
2
 by several multiples, and many are highly 
significant statistically speaking. Second, including the controls does not substantively alter the 
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coefficients or significance levels of the treatment coefficients. Together, these two findings 
suggest that our results are not driven by a breakdown of randomization because the CEP 
randomized at the site level, and that they do indeed reflect the fundamental causal effects that 
we are trying to estimate.  
5. DISCUSSION 
Our results describe experimental fundraising results from two populations—clients and 
volunteers at a financial advice non-profit. These populations both have long-term relationships 
with the fundraiser, as beneficiaries and providers (respectively) of the non-profit’s primary 
service. This opportunity allowed us a unique opportunity to test the implications of the orthodox 
identifiability effect on a novel subject pool, and to extend the identifiability effect theoretically 
and test it empirically, all in a naturalistic field setting. 
The orthodox identifiability effect received partial support among our volunteers. They were 
indeed more likely to give when a specific client was described as the beneficiary, rather than the 
firm as a whole. However, the orthodox identifiability was reversed in the clients. They were less 
likely to give when a specific volunteer was mentioned, compared to the firm. Both of these tests 
suffered from low power—in the clients’ case, the site-level randomization was compromised by 
last-minute site closings, in response to funding cuts. In the volunteers’ case, many do not pick 
up the phone. In both cases, power was compromised by the low rate of donations, across all 
conditions, which is typical in the charitable giving literature.  
The directional reversal in the orthodox identifiability effect between clients and volunteers has 
many possible post-hoc interpretations (since we did not predict it). Volunteer solicitations were 
ex ante more in line with the literature because the target (clients) was someone the solicitee 
would regard as relatively unfortunate, and because the solicitee did not have a history of 
receiving any assistance from the client. In contrast, in client solicitations, the target (volunteers) 
was likely to be richer than the solicitee, possibly undermining inequity-aversion based motives 
for donating (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and changing the donation dynamics. Moreover, the 
solicitee had received help from the target immediately prior to the solicitation, and the target 
group was in close proximity to the solicitee. These factors may induce a sense of indignation in 
the solicitee as a previously altruistic action (the volunteer’s time donation to the client) suddenly 
appears more self-serving and quid-pro-quo, undermining altruistic tendencies (Dufwenberg & 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). 
These results do not support the extended identifiability effect. Solicitations that targeted a 
familiar name were no more likely (slightly less likely) to elicit a donation than those that used 
an unfamiliar name. This directional effect holds across both volunteers and clients, suggesting 
that in at least these two cases, the personal relationship does not facilitate more giving. The 
relationship with the firm was already strong for both clients and volunteers, in contrast to the 
causes solicited to many experimental subjects. That is, subjects might already have a vivid, 
personal experience in mind when the target is individuated, so whether the name itself is known 
might not affect the subjects’ psychological reaction. We also cannot rule out a more mundane 
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explanations—for example, it is possible clients and volunteers simply forgot one another’s 
names. Still, we took considerable measures to make sure the familiar names used were recent 
and accurate—if there was any trace of the predicted effect, we did not detect it. We hope that 
future research can shed light on these issues. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1: ALLOCATION OF CLIENTS AND VOLUNTEERS TO TREATMENT BY TAX SITE 
Clients 
Site 
Volunteers 
Generic Unknown Known Generic Unknown Known 
1,181 0 0 Auburngresham 30 29 33 
0 628 0 Aurora 31 27 28 
0 15 0 ChicagoITIN 0 0 0 
0 1,211 0 Elgin 39 38 39 
1,025 0 0 Harvey 20 22 17 
0 0 694 Joiliet 25 15 22 
657 0 0 Lawndale 19 21 29 
0 0 2,971 Loop 131 161 161 
0 0 188 Mobileteam 0 0 0 
941 0 0 Pilsen 32 32 26 
0 0 968 Quadcomm 24 32 24 
603 0 0 Springfield 19 11 15 
0 3,411 0 Uptown 127 105 120 
0 0 744 Waukegan 16 24 16 
0 0 0 Wesleyn 0 0 1 
4,407 5,265 5,565 Total 513 517 531 
Clients were randomized at the site level, volunteers were randomized at the individual level. 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CLIENTS AND VOLUNTEERS 
Variable 
Mean (SD) 
Clients (n = 15,237) Volunteers (n = 1,348) 
Donation ($) 0.15 (2.4) 1.4 (13) 
Donation Dummy 0.0074 (0.086) 0.021 (0.14) 
Phone Solicited Dummy - 0.45 (0.50) 
Male Dummy 0.37 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 
Married Dummy - 0.32 (0.47) 
Age 44 (16) - 
Children Dummy - 0.11 (0.31) 
Family Size 1.8 (1.2) - 
Asian Dummy 0.050 (0.22) - 
Black Dummy 0.49 (0.50) 0.23 (0.42) 
Latino Dummy 0.27 (0.44) 0.16 (0.37) 
White Dummy 0.16 (0.37) 0.39 (0.49) 
Employed Dummy - 0.66 (0.48) 
Education: HS or Less Dummy - 0.048 (0.21) 
Education: Some College Dummy - 0.27 (0.44) 
Education: Bachelor's Dummy - 0.68 (0.46) 
Tax Refund 1,600 (2,200) - 
Returning Volunteer - 0.37 (0.48) 
All numbers are displayed to two significant figures. 
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TABLE 3: DONATIONS BY TREATMENT FOR CLIENTS (BY TAX SITE) AND VOLUNTEERS 
Subject 
Group 
Site 
Sample 
Size 
Mean Donation (SD), % Donating 
Generic Unknown Known 
Clients 
Aub. 1,181 $0.61 (6.1), 2.1% - - 
Aur. 628 - $0.016 (0.40), 0.16% - 
Chi. 15 - $0 (0), 0% - 
Elg. 1,211 - $0.066 (0.91), 0.58% - 
Har. 1,025 $0.095 (3.0), 0.098% - - 
Joi. 694 - - $0.27 (2.6), 1.2% 
Law. 657 $0.24 (2.3), 1.2% - - 
Loo. 2,971 - - $0.0067 (0.26), 0.067% 
Mob. 188 - - $0 (0), 0% 
Pil. 941 $0.27 (2.1), 1.9% - - 
Qua. 968 - - $0.18 (2.0), 1.3% 
Spr. 603 $0.066 (0.81), 0.66% - - 
Upt. 3,411 - $0.14 (1.9), 0.73% - 
Wau. 744 - - $0.013 (0.37), 0.13% 
Total 
$0.29 (3.7), 1.3% 
n = 4,407 
$0.11 (1.6), 0.63% 
n = 5,265 
$0.071 (1.3), 0.43% 
n = 5,565 
Volunteers Total 
$0.56 (5.8), 1.4% 
n = 560 
$1.6 (16), 2.3% 
n = 570 
$1.2 (10), 1.6% 
n = 561 
Means, SDs and percentages are displayed to two significant figures. 
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TABLE 4: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CLIENTS AND VOLUNTEERS 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Type Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit 
Dep. Var. Donation 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation Donation 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation Donation 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation 
Dummy 
Group Clients Clients Clients Clients Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. 
Condition - - - - - Phone - Phone - Phone - Phone 
Generic Dummy 
    2.3* 0.0057*         -1.4 -1.4 -0.0050 -0.013 
  (1.2) (0.0034)     (1.7) (2.1) (0.0056) (0.015) 
Unknown Dummy 
-1.6** -0.0030* 
  
2.4 2.3 0.011 0.024 
    (0.80) (0.0017) (1.9) (2.3) (0.0099) (0.026) 
Known Dummy 
-2.9 -0.0054 
  
0.30 0.68 0.00088 0.0059 
    (1.8) (0.0027) (1.4) (2.0) (0.0051) (0.018) 
Phone Dummy 
    
5.9*** 
 
0.025*** 
 
5.8*** 
 
0.025*** 
 (1.2) (0.0066) (1.3) (0.0067) 
Male Dummy 
    
4.0*** 3.9*** 0.017*** 0.038*** 4.0*** 4.0*** 0.017*** 0.039*** 
(0.85) (0.78) (0.0044) (0.0062) (0.88) (0.82) (0.0048) (0.0069) 
Married Dummy 
    
1.3 2.6** 0.0049 0.026** 1.2 2.6** 0.0048 0.027** 
(1.0) (1.1) (0.0048) (0.015) (1.0) (1.1) (0.0049) (0.015) 
Age 
0.11*** 2.2e-4*** 0.10*** 2.2e-4*** 
        (0.024) (7.5e-5) (0.026) (7.6e-5) 
Asian Dummy 
-4.4*** -4.9e-3*** -4.3*** -4.9e-3*** 
        (0.56) (1.2e-3) (0.59) (1.3e-3) 
Black Dummy 
-0.58 -0.0011 -0.98 -0.0020 -0.66 -0.91 -0.0026 -0.0081 -0.41 -0.71 -0.0017 -0.0063 
(1.4) (0.0023) (1.5) (0.0032) (2.7) (2.6) (0.0084) (0.020) (2.7) (2.5) (0.0090) (0.020) 
Latino Dummy 
0.80 0.0019 0.60 0.0014 -0.082 1.1 0.00085 0.014 0.069 1.2 0.0014 0.016 
(1.6) (0.0038) (1.7) (0.0039) (2.05) (2.0) (0.0077) (0.024) (2.1) (2.1) (0.0086) (0.026) 
White Dummy 
-0.62 -0.0011 -0.73 -0.0013 0.22 -0.036 0.00026 -0.0015 0.30 0.035 0.00070 -0.00052 
(1.3) (0.0023) (1.3) (0.0024) (0.99) (1.2) (0.0036 (0.011) (1.1) (1.3) (0.0042) (0.011) 
Employed Dummy 
    
-0.55 -1.7* -0.0022 -0.017* -0.58 -1.7* -0.0025 -0.017* 
(1.1) (1.0) (0.0039) (.010) (1.0) (0.98) (0.0038) (0.0098) 
Tax Refund 
3.3e-4** 6.9e-7*** 3.3e-4** 6.9e-7*** 
        (1.4e-4) (2.6e-7) (1.3e-4) (2.7e-7) 
Returning 
Volunteer     
4.1*** 3.7** 0.016** 0.034* 4.1*** 3.7** 0.017** 0.035* 
        (1.5) (1.7) (0.0085) (0.020) (1.5) (1.7) (0.0089) (0.022) 
# Obs. 15,237 15,237 15,237 15,237 1,348 605 1,187 533 1,348 605 1,187 533 
Psuedo R
2
 0.041 0.054 0.039 0.052 0.12 0.091 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.088 0.16 0.12 
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated coefficients, standard errors, pseudo R
2
 are displayed to two significant figures. Asterices denote statistical significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** 
= 1%. For parsimony, educational control variables are omitted from the table despite being included in the regressions. 
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TABLE A1: UNCONDITIONAL REGRESSIONS RESULTS FOR CLIENTS AND VOLUNTEERS 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Type Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit 
Dep. Var. Donation 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation Donation 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation Donation 
Donation 
Dummy 
Donation 
Dummy 
Group Clients Clients Clients Clients Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. Vols. 
Condition - - - - - Phone - Phone - Phone - Phone 
Generic 
Dummy 
    2.5** 0.0074*         -1.2 -0.45 -0.0054 -0.0035 
  (1.3) (0.0044)     (1.9) (2.2) (0.0092) (0.020) 
Unknown 
Dummy 
-2.0** -0.0046* 
  
1.8 1.5 0.0016 0.015 
    (0.98) (0.0026) (2.1) (2.4) (0.0087) (0.027) 
Known 
Dummy 
-3.0 -0.0067 
  
0.53 -0.62 0.0098 -0.0070 
    (1.9) (0.0034) (1.7) (1.9) (0.0087) (0.017) 
# Obs. 15,237 15,237 15,237 15,237 1,691 757 1,561 702 1,691 757 1,561 702 
Psuedo R
2
 0.013 0.018 0.012 0.016 0.0029 0.0047 0.0048 0.0086 0.0015 0.00020 0.0019 0.00030 
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated coefficients, standard errors, pseudo R
2
 are displayed to two significant figures. Asterices denote statistical significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** 
= 1%. 
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TABLE A2: PROBIT REGRESSION OF PHONE SOLICITATION 
Returning Volunteer 
-0.059** 
(0.029) 
Employed Dummy 
-0.068** 
(0.029) 
Associates / Some College (Dummy) 
-0.024 
(0.068) 
College Degree or More (Dummy) 
-0.0037 
(0.067) 
Male Dummy 
0.063** 
(0.029) 
Black Dummy 
-0.035 
(0.041) 
Latino Dummy 
-0.15*** 
(0.042) 
White Dummy 
-0.13*** 
(0.036) 
Married Dummy 
0.031 
(0.030) 
# Obs. 1,348 
Psuedo R
2
 0.020 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value “1” when a volunteer is solicited by phone (rather than 
voicemail). Figures in parentheses denote standard errors. Coefficients are marginal probabilities at the sample 
mean. All coefficients and standard errors are reported to two significant figures. Asterices denote statistical 
significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
